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INTRODUCTION  
The model of precaution has become a central tool of law and economics, beginning with Judge 
Learned Hand's brilliant opinion in United States v Carroll Towing Co.3 In it he argues that a defendant 
should be found liable for harm if and only if the expected cost of additional care is less than the 
expected benefit.4 
The model of precaution relies upon the economics of incentives, a subfield of game theory – the study 
of how individuals choose actions when these actions affect others.5  The landmark books of  
Professors William Landes and Richard Posner and Professor Steven Shavell illustrate how the 
precaution model illuminates a wide variety of legal rules.6 Professors Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas 
Malamed  show how it can be used to integrate tort and property.7 Professor Robert Cooter uses the 
model to provide a unified analysis of tort and contract.8 
A central result of the model is that the standard for negligence provides incentives for individuals to 
take socially optimal actions.9 This perspective is controversial. Professor Richard Epstein argues that 
the model of precaution cannot explain observed law, and does not provide an adequate model of 
causation as used in court.10 He suggests that the socially efficient rule should be one of strict 
liability.11  Posner responded providing a number of examples where Epstein's approach would lead to 
undesirable results.12 He describes Epstein's model as being based upon moral rather than economic 
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In this paper we show that the model of precaution is a special case of a more general economic model. 
We develop a simple technique for discussing this more general model that we dub a “Savage Table,”14 
following Professor Leonard Savage .15 Our more general model based on general equilibrium theory 
and decision theory encompasses the views of both Posner and Epstein and sheds light on Epstein's 
observation that the Hand rule is not consistently used to determine liability.16 We show that rational 
choice does not imply the Hand rule unless one imposes additional restrictions that are not often 
satisfied in practice. 
We show that strict liability can be viewed as a special case of the negligence standard. In addition, the 
notion of a causal effect can be easily and naturally defined in our framework. The benefit of a clear 
definition is that it highlights the key evidentiary requirements to determine causation. Recent work in 
statistics has greatly clarified our understanding of causal inference.17 There is no way to prove the 
existence of a causal relationship. The best we can do is to use a credible model of the world, and make 
causal statements within the context of the model.18 
Once we look at economic phenomena from our more general perspective we are led to the following 
legal impossibility theorem:  For every legal rule that is potentially efficient there exists an 
environment with rational decision makers for which the rule is not efficient. A rational decision maker 
must make choices conditional upon the information she has. Given incomplete information, there is no 
guarantee that a rule that encourages good decision-making in one context will work in another. 
Posner observed that the best way to deal with this problem is to rely upon empirical evidence.19 
Models are still useful. In fact Professor Paul Holland shows that model building is essential to the 
measurement of causal effects.20 Theory and evidence must work together to identify those worldviews 
that are more successful than the alternatives. 
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. The next Part provides a very brief discussion of the 
background theory we use. This is followed by a simplified presentation of the main ideas of the 
economic theory of exchange and rational choice, in particular the key notions of a “commodity,” an 
“act” and a “Savage Table” which provides a convenient way to illustrate these concepts. We show that 
this model leads naturally to a well defined notion of causality and relate it to the work of Holland.21 
We then illustrate how these ideas can be applied to tort law, and discuss some of the empirical work in 
the area, with particular reference to our own empirical research on tort law. 
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I. BACKGROUND  
The purpose of this paper is to briefly outline an alternative to the standard model of precaution.  This 
alternative relies upon ideas developed in the 1950s by Professors Herbert Simon, Leonard Savage, 
Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu.22 Savage's ideas were integrated into modern game theory by 
Professors David Kreps and Robert Wilson,24 and later applied to the law by Professors Douglas Baird, 
Robert Gertner, and Randal Picker.25 Nabil Al-Najjar shows that many of these ideas can be 
reformulated in a Bayesian framework and applied to important issues in regulation, such as climate 
change.26 
Debreu was awarded the 1983 Nobel prize in economics for his lucid development of the two welfare 
theorems of general equilibrium theory. The first welfare theorem states that when markets are 
“complete” then competitive equilibria are efficient.  The second welfare theorem is that efficient 
allocations can be realized as the outcome of a competitive equilibrium. These very technical results 
were later popularized by Professor Milton Friedman, who argued that a free market is the best way to 
allocate resources.27 Yet, strictly speaking, the welfare theorems cannot be applied to observed 
economies because markets in practice are always incomplete. Friedman recognized this problem, but 
he reasoned that in an economy with free markets, markets would become more complete, and 
therefore more efficient, over time.28 
Professor Oliver Hart showed that adding more markets could however lead to less efficient 
outcomes.29 Thus, as long as markets remain incomplete, there may be a role for legal institutions to 
make markets work more efficiently.  Hart applied insights from Arrow and Debreu's general 
equilibrium theory to the understanding of property law as it applies to the theory of the firm.30  
This paper considers the application of ideas from Arrow and Debreu to a second aspect of civil law, 
tort law.  The standard model of precaution supposes that individuals respond in a predictable fashion 
to the incentives provided by the tort system. Yet, as we will see, the empirical evidence suggests that 
the extent to which the tort system reduces the costs of injuries is sensitive to the context. We use 
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“Savage Tables,” developed using Debreu's notion of a commodity31 combined with the seminal ideas 
of Savage  to explain this sensitivity to context.32  A richer theory of tort suggests a more nuanced role 
for the courts than simply setting rules for potential tortfeasors such that the benefits of taking 
precaution are weighed against the costs of causing harm.     
 
II. THE  NOTION  OF A   COMMODITY  
Debreu's classic, Theory of Value provides a model of a world with scarce resources and individuals 
who care about how these resources are allocated.33 The model provides a very general way to think 
about the world: Inefficient outcomes stem from failures of the environment to satisfy the axioms of 
general equilibrium theory. Hence, the theory provides a benchmark for evaluating any allocation of 
resources.34 
Debreu introduces the idea of a “commodity” that generalizes our concept of a good or service.35 First 
of all, a commodity must be something that exists and enters our utility function, that is, something that 
we do or do not want.  The ideas of “wheat” or “wages,” are not well defined commodities because a 
good becomes a commodity only when its characteristics are precisely specified (for example the 
quality of the wheat), as well as the date and location at which the good is traded. Similarly, labor 
services become a commodity when the characteristics of the service (was the waiter friendly?) are 
specified, as well as the time and the delivery location of the service.36 
The next step in general equilibrium theory is to suppose that markets are “complete,” that is one can 
trade any desired commodity. The first welfare theorem states that at a competitive equilibrium – each 
person chooses the bundle of goods they prefer and supply equals demand – the allocation is Pareto 
efficient. Any change to the competitive equilibrium will make some party strictly worse off.37 
In the context of the model of precaution the assumption that markets are complete implies that every 
action chosen is a different good with a different price. As Professor Gary Becker [1976] observes, the 
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notion of price used here is not the same as the notion of price in law.38 In the second welfare theorem 
price measures the opportunity cost of the good – technically it is the Lagrange multiplier associated 
with the aggregate resource constraint.  Economists talk of the price of the good even when it is not 
traded.  They mean the marginal value of the resource constraint, a concept that is very useful when 
evaluating the efficiency property of an allocation, but may not correspond to an observed price. 
Price in law defines the terms of trade for a good exchanged between two parties – the amount that the 
seller agrees to pay the buyer for a good, rather than the shadow value of a good. If the good delivered 
is not satisfactory or the buyer does not pay then there is breach of contract. In that case Judge Oliver 
Wendell Holmes [1897], page 462 observes:  
“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do 
not keep it,—and nothing else.”39In other words, if the seller chooses a quantity or quality different 
from the agreement, then the amount she receives will be reduced, normally using the rule of 
expectation damages. 
In order to distinguish the two concepts of price without adding too much jargon, we call the former 
shadow value an “economic price” and the later transacted value a “contract price.”    We can see the 
difference with a simple example. Suppose that the seller chooses to deliver or not, and agrees to pay 
damages for non-delivery. In this case there are two economic prices corresponding to each of the two 
commodities – the price that is paid when delivery occurs and the price that is paid when delivery does 
not occur.  
The law in this case is quite a bit more subtle than the economic analysis. In particular, the law 
distinguishes between several contract forms. One is a two part tariff in which the seller can choose to 
deliver or not, and then is paid the corresponding price (say penalty k when there is no delivery). The 
second is a specific liquidation damage clause requiring k be paid in the event of non-delivery. 
In the first case non-delivery is not breach of contract – only non-payment is a breach. In contrast, in 
the second case non-delivery is a breach of contract. In the former case, as long as the seller pays the 
penalty, there is no breach of contract and the buyer has no right to bring an action against the seller. In 
the second case, the buyer has the right to bring the seller to court. Even if the seller voluntarily pays 
the stipulated damages, the buyer has the right to have a court review the dispute, a right that is denied 
in the first case. In a world where going to court is costly, these contracts are not the same. 
Finally, there is the “fixed price” contract in which the parties agree to a price and quantity/quality of 
the good to be traded, with no other terms. In this case non-delivery is a breach of contract, which gives 
the buyer the right to a court hearing to determine damages. 
Scholars often claim that fixed price contracts are the norm for many sales contracts, and that this is a 
puzzle for economics because the theory predicts different prices in different states of the world. 
However, since breach leads to a different allocation from non-breach, the contract price may be fixed, 
but the economic price is not.40  
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The development of norms for the production and exchange of cotton provides an example of the 
creation of new commodities. Professor Lisa Bernstein describes the historical evolution of the private 
law regarding cotton.41 One can view the development of “bright line rules” as the creation of well-
defined quality standards for cotton.42 Once quality standards were specified, cotton could be traded 
upon an open market with different quality goods fetching different prices.  
Chapter 7 of Debreu  addresses uncertainty in the context of the commodity model.43  The model 
begins with the hypothesis that one can in principle describe all possible world histories (called states), 
including all possible future events. In this model learning can be viewed like the fog lifting. As time 
moves on some histories (states of the world) do not occur, and fewer and fewer possibilities are left, 
until time fully unfolds and all that remains is a single state representing all that can be known. An 
event in this model is a set of possible states. For example the event that it rains today means that all 
states in which it did not rain have not occurred. 
Uncertainty can be accommodated by allowing a commodity to be state/event contingent.  Consider 
home insurance. It is a commodity that pays the buyer an amount L if and only if the house burns 
down. There are many possible contracts – L could be fixed, L could be a function L(s), which pays the 
full loss when a fire of severity s occurs. Such contracts can be bought and sold in a market. 
There are two points worth highlighting. First, bargaining parties often think in terms of moving the 
burden of a loss in a state to one party or the other. Calabresi's seminal article Some Thoughts on Risk 
Distribution and the Law of Torts explicitly addresses this issue and discusses the various meanings 
that have been attached to risk sharing.44 The notion of a commodity illustrates that risk is like any 
other characteristic of a good. The allocation of risk across states is an issue of personal preference and 
individuals will differ in their valuation of different allocations of risk. 
The second, subtler point is that the definition of uncertainty does not require a theory of probability! 
Once payoffs are defined for each state, parties can trade and agree to state contingent prices without 
reference to probability! Probability is central to the theory of precaution beginning with the Hand rule 




III. SAVAGE AND THE THEORY OF DECISION 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contracts that the models predict do not exist in the world. Instead, we see simple fixed price contracts or contracts that 
are conditional on a relatively small number of real world contingencies. Intuitively, the problem with the predicted 
contracts is that they are too complex for parties to design.” 
41 Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and 
Institutions, 99 Mich L Rev 1724 (2001).  
42 Id at 1731. . 
43 Debreu, Theory of Value at 98–102 (cited in note 23).  
44 Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L J 499 (1961).  
45 Savage, The Foundations of Statistics (cited in note 16).  
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In this Part we briefly outline the Savage model of decision making, or choice.46 Savage's work clearly 
illustrates why the model of precaution, while useful, does not accurately capture how individuals think 
about decisions, nor how a particular legal rule may affect actual choice. 
A. The Savage Algorithm and Savage Tables 
The Savage algorithm for rational choice follows several steps.  First, a decision maker builds a “small 
world model.”  This is a simplification of the real world since it is impossible for anyone to 
contemplate all possible states of the world.  He states “This [i.e. the idea that people consider all 
possible alternatives and then choose the best] is utterly ridiculous … because the task implied in 
making such a decision is not remotely resembled by human possibility.”47  
Model building requires the decision-maker to identify those possible states of the world that are 
relevant to the decision at hand. A state is a complete description of those possible futures that are 
relevant for determining the consequence of a decision. These might include the possibility of rain, 
harm to others and so on. The focus is on only those states that the decision maker believes are 
relevant.   
Model building is expensive and time consuming.  An immediate implication is that even when the 
decision maker is sophisticated, models will necessarily be incomplete and contain errors.  In contrast, 
in law and economics scholars often assume that sophisticated parties do not make errors.  However, 
the Savage model suggests that rational parties will sometimes err and that they may do so because 
they fail to consider events that should have been relevant to their decision. 
Savage calls each choice an “act.”  By this he is explicitly recognizing that choices have uncertain 
consequences. A number of outcomes may stem from the decision to bring an umbrella to work – the 
umbrella may be lost or the decision-maker may use it when it rains. Conversely, the “act” of not 
bringing an umbrella to work ensures that it is safe at home, but the person may get wet when it rains. 
In the famous case of United States v Carroll Towing  a barge broke loose from its moorings and 
caused an accident. The decision or “act” in question was how the bargee adjusted the mooring lines 
and whether a crew member was left on board at night, with the relevant events being whether the 
barge broke loose  and the consequences of it breaking loose.48  
We can formalize the problem as follows. We begin by modeling the possible states of the world and 
the consequences that occur in each state. In the context of Carroll Towing suppose there are three 
states, h, m, and l.  State h is the high or good state corresponding to good weather. The middle state, 
m, corresponds to say strong winds. The low state, l, corresponds to a hurricane. 
For simplicity, suppose that in the event that the barge breaks loose, there is a fixed harm of H>0.  If 
the weather is good then the barge never leaves its moorings. If the event is l, then the barge always 
breaks loose, and hence a harm of H is always suffered.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 See Yoram Halevy and Vincent Feltkemp, A Bayesian Approach to Uncertainty Aversion, 72 R of Econ Stud 449, 449–
451 (2005), (showing how one can integrate behavioral economics into the Savage model). 
47 Savage, The Foundations of Statistics at 16 (cited in note 16). 
48 Carroll, 159 F2d at 170–72. 
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The interesting case is state m.  If care is taken, no harm is suffered, but if the agent is not careful, the 
barge leaves its moorings and causes harm H.  We can identify high and low care with two distinct 
state contingent commodities, where the three values inside the brackets show the harm in each state of 
the world under either high effort or low effort on the part of the bargee: 
• High effort: {0, 0, -H} 
 
• Low effort: {0, -H, -H} 
Notice that this is effectively a complete description of the consequence of different effort levels in 
different states of the world. 
The next step is to discuss the bargee's choice of effort. We can suppose that there is no cost to low 
effort, but high effort costs c.  A “act” for the bargee would be a mapping between effort and the payoff 
consequences for each choice.  If there is no liability then the payoffs will be: 
• High effort: {– c, – c , – c}  
 
• Low effort: {0, 0, 0} 
This information can be summarized in what we dub a “Savage Table.” Each box provides the payoff 




h m l 
aL (0,0) (0, – H) (0, – H) 
aH (– c, 0) (– c, 0) (– c, – H) 
 
Table 1. Payoffs with No Liability in United States v Caroll Towing 
 
These acts provide all the information necessary to make a decision – for each state of the world the 
decision maker understands the consequence of each action.  A rational decision maker ranks the acts 
and chooses the one she prefers. In this example she chooses one action or the other.  Decision theory 
only requires that the bargee make a choice. In this example, she is better off choosing aL since she gets 
zero in this case, and would pay -c if she choose aH.  Notice that probabilities are not needed when 
making this choice.  
Deciding what to do under a negligence regime that has her pay H when she causes the accident is a 
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h m l 
aL (0,0) (0, – H) (0, – H) 
aH (– c, 0) (– c, 0) (– c, – H) 
. 
Table 2. Payoffs under the negligence rule 
 
Now she has to compare paying c in every state with paying H in state m.  Rational choice theory only 
requires that she make a choice, and that her choices are transitive (that is, that she can consistently 
rank her decisions) and complete (that she makes a decision).  There is no need to formally introduce 
probability, though beliefs about probabilities may well be helpful to making a decision. 
What Savage shows is that in situations like this, individuals choose as if they have assigned 
probabilities to the states h, m, and l.49 (the exact conditions are found on the inside of the cover of the 
Dover edition of the book). If we let these probabilities be given by: 
p = {p1, p2, p3}  
then the bargee chooses high effort if and only if: 
– c – p3 x H ˃ – (p2 + p3) x H 
These probabilities are values derived from the preferences and beliefs of the bargee.  There is no 
reason for the judge and the bargee to have the same assessment of the likelihood of a particular state – 
especially for states that are infrequent. This argument does not preclude the use of the Hand formula 
by judges:  It may be a useful way to determine a legal rule.  However, there is no logical reason to 
assume that the probabilities used by judges will affect the decisions of potential tortfeasors in a 
consistent or even in a predictable fashion.  What this simple model illustrates is how the actions of the 
bargee are causally related to outcomes. A different causal question is how the choice of tort regime, 
such as the choice of strict liability versus a negligence standard, affects the choices of individuals in 
practice.  This is the question that we address next. 
B.  Potential Outcomes and the Fundamental Problem of Causal Inference 
The idea of a causal relationship has a long history.50 Savage treats causal relationships as an integral 
element of what it means to act.  In particular, the barge example makes clear that whether or not a 
decision has a causal effect depends upon the state of nature. 
If state l or h occurs, then the choice of action has no effect upon the level of harm.  In the low state 
there is no harm regardless of the action of the bargee.  This fact does not mean that there should be no 
consequence.  For example, drunk drivers may be fined even when they do not cause an accident. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49  Savage, The Foundations of Statistics at 27–55 (cited in note 16).  
50 See, for examplethe entry in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy where there is an extensive bibliography. See 
Jonathan Schaffer, The Metaphysics of Causation, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 ed), online at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-metaphysics/ (visited Aug 28, 2013).   
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Professors Jennifer Arlen and Bentley MacLeod point out that with judgment proof tortfeasors, it is 
efficient to penalize them whenever they are careless regardless of whether there is harm.51 They show 
that the law of vicarious liability can achieve this effect by making organizations liable for the torts of 
their agents.52 
In practice the issue is complicated when the state is imprecise, unobserved or unknowable.  Hence, 
while in theory the definition is clear, in practice whether an act causes an outcome is often 
controversial.  In economics, the most widely used approach to this problem is the potential outcomes 
approach. 
We introduce this idea and illustrate how to use Savage Tables from the perspective of the courts, 
rather than the tortfeasor. Suppose that there is a state n, which is a nasty storm similar to l, but which 
would not result in the barge breaking loose if the bargee chooses aH.  Suppose the courts are unable to 
distinguish between states n and l, but they can distinguish between states h, m and the combination of 




h m n  l 
aL (0,0) (0, – H) (0, – H) (0, – H) 
aH (– c, 0) (– c, 0) (– c, 0) (– c, – H) 
 
Table 3. Acts with States h,m,n,l 
 
Here states m and n are identical from the perspective of the bargee.  Harm is avoided in both states by 
taking the precaution. Hence in both states m and n we can say that the bargee could causally avoid the 
harm through her actions. 
Let us now consider the court's perspective and use the Savage Table to describe different legal rules – 
here each rule can be view as an “act” because it associates an outcome with a state. Suppose that the 
acts in the court's choice set are strict liability (denoted SL) in which the tortfeasor pays H whenever 
there is an accident, and the Epstein Rule (denoted ER) in which the tortfeasor pays H whenever she 
causes an accident.  Epstein recommended that this rule be used rather than the Hand rule.53 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Jennifer Arlen and Bentley MacLeod, Torts, expertise, and authority: liability of physicians and managed care 
organizations, 36 Rand J of Econ 494, 497 (2005).  
52 Id at 516.  
53 Epstein, 2 J Legal Stud at 203 (cited in note 11).  
	  
	  





Acts by Courts 
Events 
No Harm Harm in Moderate Storm Harm in Severe Storm 
States - (act, weather) combinations 
(aL, h) (aH, h) (aH, m) (aH, n) (aL, m) (aL, n) (aL, l) (aH, l) 
Strict Liability 0 0 0 0 H H H H 
Epstein Rule 0 0 0 0 H ? ? ? 
 
Table 4. Potential Outcomes 
 
In this simple example, the potential outcomes are “no harm” or “harm.” The court observes the event 
associated with the harm.  Technically an “event” is a set of states.  The term is used in probability 
theory to refer to the information known at the time a decision is taken. In this example, the court only 
observes one of the potential outcomes, and the severity of the storm - h, m or {n or l}. 
In this example it is assumed that the courts cannot observe the action of the bargee.  It is worth 
highlighting that acts in the past become part of the description of the state in the future.  That is, the 
act of the bargee affects the states facing the court.  Thus this model can be adopted to deal with 
strategic situations, such as the case of contributory negligence where the harmed party can also make 
decisions that affect the outcome.  However, it is beyond the current article to explain how this works.54 
- see Kreps and Wilson [1982] for details. 
With the information available the courts can determine causality in the state “Harm with Moderate 
Storm.” In that situation harm occurs if and only if the bargee is not careful—in other words the courts 
can both infer the action of the bargee and note that there is causation. Hence, Epstein's Rule can be 
applied and liability assigned to the bargee. 
In the event “Harm with Severe Storm” the exact severity of the storm is unknown, and we cannot tell 
if harm could have been avoided. Technically causation is well defined - that is the agent caused the 
harm if and only if she choose aL and the state of the weather was n.  If instead the state was l then 
nothing the bargee could have done would have stopped the harm.  If state n were not possible, then we 
would be back to the original situation in which nothing the bargee can do that would avoid harm in the 
event of a storm, and under both the Hand rule and the Epstein Rule there would be no liability. 
In practice, it is not possible to directly observe all the primitive states in a decision problem. Is there a 
way, at least conceptually, to measure the causal effect? Holland provides an elegant synthesis of the 
potential outcome approach that provides a solution and has become very influential in economics.55 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 For details, see Kreps and Wilson, 50 Econometrica at 863 (cited in note 25). 
55Holland, 81 J Am Stat Assn at 959 (cited in note 18).For a modern treatment, see Guido W. Imbens and Donald B. 
Rubin, Causal Inference in Statistics and Social Sciences (Oxford 2011); Jonah B. Gelbach, Locking the Doors to 
Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 Yale L J 2270, 2295 (2012). 
(illustrating the application of the potential outcomes framework to the question of how Supreme Court decision affects the 
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Rather than attempt to build a complex state space model, the potential outcomes approach is very 
pragmatic and is based upon relationships between observed variables. 
In this example, the potential outcomes are No Harm and Harm. Let Y(a) be the outcome if action a is 
chosen, where Y = 1 if harm occurs and Y=0 if not. The counter factual question is what would happen 
if the bargee chose high effort instead of low effort?  The causal effect of high effort is then defined by: 
(2) CE = Y(aH) - Y(aL).  
The point here is that this effect is measured after the state of nature has been revealed. Holland 
observes that there is only one sure way that we could measure (2).56  It would require having the 
bargee choose low effort and observing the result.  We would then have to go back in time to the exact 
same situation, choose high effort, and observe the result. Going back in time would ensure that the 
same state occurred again, and we would then be able to see the counter factual effect of changing 
effort. If we had a time machine then, like the hapless hero in the movie Groundhog Day, we could 
experiment with different life experiences until we made the best choices.57 This is clearly impossible, 
an observation that Holland calls the “fundamental problem of causal inference”  
Holland's contribution is to illustrate a way of thinking about and measuring causality without directly 
observing the deep structure of the environment (whether the state is n or l in our example).  Suppose 
for example, we want to know the causal effect of penicillin.  What is often done is to take a group of 
sick patients and treat some with penicillin and some with a placebo.  Under the assumption that the 
sick patients are all similar, then we will be able to deduce the action of the drug by comparing the two 
groups.  Note that conducting this type of trial does not require knowledge of the exact mechanism 
through which the drug works. It does require a strong assumption about the similarity of the patients.  
We now know, for example, that penicillin is not equally effective against all infections, so if the 
patients had different types of infection, or if some of them were allergic to penicillin, then this would 
affect the results of the trial.    
What we learn from Savage's model is that the problem of determining causality is one of information 
and not philosophy.  The fact that we cannot observe the deep structure of every case before the courts 
implies that there are situations where causality is indeterminate. No amount of philosophizing can 
substitute for this lack of information.  In the next Part we discuss how the Savage model can used to 
discuss tort doctrine. The model teaches us there cannot be an optimal rule that applies to every 
situation.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
outcomes in related cases).  
56 See Holland, 81 J Am Stat Assn at 959 (cited in note 18). 
57  Groundhog Day (Columbia Pictures 1993), in the film Bill Murray plays Phil Conners, an arrogant TV 
weatherman who is in a time loop repeating the day over and over until he finally learns to become a good person.  Like 
Holland's article, critical appreciation of the movie has increased over time and it was listed in the United States Film 
Registry in 2006. See National Film Registry, National Film Preservation Board (Library of Congress Dec 13, 2011), online 
at http://www.loc.gov/film/registry_titles.php (visited Aug 8, 2013). 
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IV. Tort Law 
Tort law allows individuals freedom of action, but assigns liability in states of the world that cause 
harm to others.  Let us return to the Savage Table used to represent the Hand model of precaution. The 
most general tort rule in this case can be written as: 
Action 
State 
h m l 
aL (0,0) (– Lm, Lm – H) (– Lt, Lt –  H) 
aH (– c, 0) (– c, 0) (– Lt –  c, Lt –  H) 
 
Table 5. General Tort Rule 
If courts can observe the state, the issue is how to set Lm and Ll. A necessary condition for liability 
under the negligence rule is that the action of the agent must cause the injury. That cannot occur in state 
l and thus Ll = 0 under the negligence regime.  Under the Learned Hand rule the tortfeasor is liable in 
state m if and only if the expected harm is greater than cost: pmH > c. The relevant probability is not 
necessarily an objective quantity, but a value established by the court (though of course objective 
evidence may be used to determine the probability).  
Consider now the famous case of Helling v Carey,58 a malpractice action against ophthalmologists in 
which a patient claimed that she suffered permanent visual damage due to glaucoma as a result of 
defendants' failure to diagnose and treat the condition.  Ophthalmologists rarely performed glaucoma 
tests on young patients, and the court found for the defendants at trial.  However, upon appeal, the 
appellate court used the Learned Hand rule to argue that since the cost of the test was very low, it 
should be administered as a matter of practice. The decision was reversed and returned to the trial court 
to assess damages.59 
In the context of our model of actions and states of the world, we can represent the court's view of the 




A B C 
aL (0,0) (–H, 0) (0, –H) 
aH (–c, 0) (–c, 0) (–c, –H) 
 
Table 6. Negligence Rule 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 519 P2d 981 (Wash 1974), disapproved of by Barton v Owen, 71 Cal App 3d 484 (Ct App 1977).  
59 Carey, 519 P2d at 983.  
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Where in state A the patient does not have glaucoma, in state B the patient has glaucoma, and in state C 
the patient has some other serious eye disease. 
The key point is that the rule followed by the court and illustrated in Table 6 is not necessarily the rule 
followed by most ophthalmologists when they decide how to treat their patients.  Arguably, 
ophthalmologists are concerned with providing appropriate care.  If the court determines that it is 
negligent to omit a glaucoma test, then medical practice is likely to change in the direction of always 
doing the glaucoma test.   
Note that it is not even clear that the Learned Hand rule was applied correctly in this case.  The total 
cost of testing millions of people without the disease could be greater than the benefit of detecting one 
case of the disease unless the cost of blindness is infinite.  But in terms of influencing 
ophthalmologists’ behavior, the true costs and benefits are irrelevant once the court has spoken.  
Similar issues come up in the case of screening for prostate cancer, or doing mammograms on women 
under fifty. Even though experts now agree that the costs of such screening may exceed the benefits, 
the screenings remain embedded in medical practice. 
The fact that the court uses the Hand rule does not require individual decision makers to use the same 
rule.  The standard law and economics approach evaluates different tort rules as if the potential 
tortfeasors make decisions using the Learned Hand rule. The example of the ophthalmologists suggests 
that this is an error!  Individuals do modify their behaviour in response to incentives, but there is little 
evidence that courts are good at predicting their responses.  
Individuals often respond to incentives in unexpected ways. For example, Professor Steven Kerr  
provides many examples from successful firms of incentive systems with unintended consequences.60 
One firm wired a secretary's typewriter to measure key strokes and tied her compensation to the 
number of strokes.  The secretary responded by spending her lunch breaks hitting a single key on her 
typewriter!61   
Legal doctrines, such as the defence of contributory negligence, evolve in response to cases that 
document the behaviour of individuals in specific situations.  The building of a model or world view 
focused on a small number of actions and states may ignore some important possibilities. 
A. Strict Liability vs. the Negligence Rule 
The framework we have developed is helpful for illustrating the difference between strict liability (in 
which the tortfeasor is liable whenever there is harm) and the negligence rule (in which the tortfeasor is 
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liable only if he is negligent).  We will illustrate the difference in behaviour under these two rules using 
the model with actions and states applied to the case of the Good Samaritan doctor. 
The potential Good Samaritan can exert high effort, low effort, or he can take evasive actions to avoid 
liability completely.  For example a physician who happens on a traffic accident can leave the scene 
unobserved, failing to disclose that he is a physician.   As in the case United States v Carroll Towing, 




h m n l 
Events 
Light Injury Moderate Injury Severe Injury 
aL (0, 0) (–H, 0) (–H, 0) (–H, 0) 
aH (–c, 0) (–c, 0) (–c, 0) (– (H+c), 0) 
a0 (–u, –H) (–u, –H) (–u, –H) (–u, –H) 
 
Table 7. Strictly Liability with Evasion 
Here the first term in each bracket is the payoff to the doctor while the second is the payoff to the 
patient.  Assume that all the court can observe is whether the injury is light, moderate, or severe.  In the 
case of severe injury, the court cannot tell whether the physician could have ameliorated the injury or 
not.  We also assume that the court cannot observe evasive actions and if a0 is chosen there is never any 
liability. We further assume that the potential Good Samaritan must choose an action without knowing 
the full extent of the victim's injuries. The payoff -u is the disutility or guilt felt by the Good Samaritan 
if he does not treat.  
Causation here is necessarily probabilistic. Epstein argues that one should use the rule of strict liability 
whenever there is causation.62  But in the case of “Severe Injury” it is not possible for the courts to 
establish causality.  They are forced to assign probabilities to states.  Moreover, the physician can 
always completely avoid liability by choosing a0.  Epstein argues that physicians should be held liable 
in these cases while Posner disagrees pointing out that the Good Samaritan can always find a way to 
avoid the situation.63 
More importantly, if the potential Good Samaritan faces strict liability, then he has a positive incentive 
to avoid becoming involved.  Instead, one would like to provide positive incentives to act when it will 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Epstein, 2 J Legal Stud at 203 (cited in note 11). 
63 See Id at 199; Posner, 2 J Legal Stud at 219–20 (cited in note 13).  
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be helpful.  If we interpret the negligence rule as imposing liability only if there has been harm in state 
m then if u > c the Good Samaritan would always act.  Hence, the negligence rule could improve 
outcomes relative to strict liability by improving the incentives faced by the Good Samaritan.  
Notice that in the case of Helling v Carey the requirement to do a glaucoma test is easy to implement 
and if the test is viewed as a standard part of an eye exam, then the ophthalmologist will include the 
cost in the standard bill.64  In other words, compliance with the tort system is much easier when 
individuals know that liability is triggered by well-defined events.  
Consider next the case of product liability, where the rule of strict liability is normally used.  In that 
case the default action is the non-production of the good.  Consider the use of sports equipment such as 
skis or skateboards where the nature of an injury depends upon the intensity of the use.  The courts can 
observe the intensity, but in the case of intensive use, the court may have difficulty determining 
whether an injury is the result of product failure, or an unavoidable result of the activity itself.  The 




h m n l 
Events 
Light Activity Moderate Activity Extreme Activity 
aL (P, u) (P, u - H) (P, u - H) (P, u - H) 
aH (P - c, u) (P - c, u) (P - c, u - H) (P - c, u - H) 
a0 (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) 
 
Table 8. Strict Liability 
 
In this case the seller pays the harm H regardless of whether or not he takes appropriate precaution.  
What differentiates this case from the medical liability case is that evasive action prevents the good 
from being produced, and hence prevents harm. 
In a world with perfect information the cost of harm can always be offset via the price.  The difficulty 
is that in general there is asymmetric information – individuals cannot observe aL  or aH  and hence they 
are not in a position to evaluate the good. Moreover, the seller may have a better idea than the buyer 
about the range of ways the product will be used.  Under strict liability sellers internalize harms from 
the use of the product, even when the product failure might not be caused by their actions.  Strict 
liability provides a positive incentive for the manufacturer to learn about the potential harm before 
production begins.  Once production has started, the manufacturer has a positive incentive to avoid 
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learning about state l after the fact.  In contrast to the medical liability case where harm occurs if the 
physician does not act, here harm occurs only if the manufacturer acts. 
The use of Savage Tables highlights both the considerations that are included in the analysis, as well as 
those that are excluded.  There will always be both states of the world and acts that are not considered 
ex ante by either the courts or individuals.  We do not exclude the use of probabilities, but highlight the 
fact that probabilities are values that are determined after one has built a model of the world which 
defines the relevant states. 
B. Informed Consent 
Medical services are generally covered by the negligence rule which not only reduces the incentive for 
physicians to withhold services, but allows the standard of care to vary over time. From the perspective 
of the Savage model medical services are acts that represent complex commodities that include the 
possibility that there is harm to the patient.  Tort law can be viewed as enforcing a contract defined in 
terms of the performance of the physician, rather than in terms of the goods supplied (which may 
include harm).  
Savage tables highlight the fact that services are necessarily state contingent. When a physician 
provides services there no guarantee that the patient will be cured, only that the physician will do her 
best to provide appropriate care. Whenever surgery is performed there is a chance of misadventure. 
Doctors can miss symptoms and fail to diagnose conditions that with hindsight they should have seen. 
The product they are selling is not a good outcome, but the promise to do a good job.  
The requirement that the standard of care meets community standards is nothing more than an 
obligation to provide a service with certain characteristics. The negligence rule as modelled using the 
model of precaution requires that the care supplied meets community standards. Yet, community 
standards are a moving target.  For example, Scott v Bradford,65  established that providing information 
about available alternatives and obtaining informed consent “is as essential as the physician's care and 
skill.”66   The services provided by physicians are complex commodities in the sense of Debreu, and 
their nature varies over time.  
It is likely that our concept of the commodity represented by medical care will continue to evolve.  In 
our most recent work,67 we distinguish between the diagnostic skill and surgical skill of obstetricians. 
In the context of the current discussion, we can think of the commodity the physician supplies as a 
complex good consisting of both aspects of skill.  We show that while higher surgical skill is beneficial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 606 P2d 554, 556–57 (Okla 1980).  
66 See Parris v Limes, 277 P3d 1259, 1263 (Okla 2012). 
67 Janet M. Currie and W. Bentley MacLeod, Diagnosis and Unnecessary Procedure Use: Evidence from C-Section (18977), 
(Technical report, NBER, Cambridge, MA 2013), online at http://www.nber.org/papers/w18977 (visited Aug 29, 2013).  
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to high-risk women, better diagnostic skill benefits both high and low risk women, since both groups 
benefit from better matching of medical procedures to their needs.68 
Savage reminds us that the act of building a model is an explicit tool used in the process of making a 
thoughtful decision.  Given that perfect models are not possible, it also highlights the dangers of relying 
solely upon a theoretical model when evaluating the quality of a legal rule. In the next Part we discuss 
empirical evaluations of tort law. 
 
V. THE CAUSAL IMPACT OF LEGAL RULES UPON BEHAVIOR 
Using Savage Tables we have presented a number of examples of how tort law affects individual 
decisions.  To recap, the first step in the rational choice model is thinking in terms of potential 
outcomes, states and acts.  In some situations, the model allows us to evaluate rules without reference 
to probabilities.  Even if a potential tortfeasor is fully rational, her model of the world does not have to 
correspond to a court's.   
We have also shown that strict liability and negligence can create different incentives to build a 
detailed model of the world.  Under strict liability a manufacturer has an incentive to consider possible 
states in which the consumer might be harmed by their product.  If we rely instead upon market 
pricing, then the cost of investigating these events would be moved to the consumer, who would 
typically have considerably fewer resources and less experience to carry out such an exercise. 
Conversely, the negligence standard allows individuals to act and supply services free of liability as 
long as they meet community standards of behavior.  This rule creates an incentive to take precaution 
while reducing the incentive to withhold services in situations where there is a chance of harm, as in 
the case of the Good Samaritan physician. 
Given that individuals are likely to build different models of the world when making choices, there is 
no a priori way of determining the impact of a legal rule in practice.69  Here we briefly discuss a few 
contributions that directly address this issue and which show that in fact tort law does lead to 
deterrence. 
As we discussed in the causality Part above, estimating the causal impact of the law upon behavior is 
very difficult. Many factors are changing at the same time, and hence it is difficult to know if observed 
changes are due to a rule or due to some unobserved factor.  In keeping with the discussion above, 
theoretical models of tort tend to emphasize particular types of incentives to the exclusion of others, 
with the result that they will not always make the best empirical predictions.  Hence, it is necessary to 
turn to the data.  One of the best ways to measure the effect of the law is to view the United States as a 
laboratory in which each state sets its own rules. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68 Id at 26–33.  
69 See generally Posner, 2 J Legal Stud 220–21 (cited in note 13).  
	  
	  
Page 19 of 24 
 
Even though the United States has a common culture, one cannot use cross-state variation in rules to 
look at the effect of the law. Each state has a unique history, meaning that observed rules and outcomes 
have multiple sources. Rather, the standard approach is to use variations over time to explore the causal 
effect of a rule. The idea is that we can compare relevant outcomes in the year before and after a rule 
change to see if there is an effect upon behaviour.  In this approach, the state before the rule change is 
used as the best approximation to what the state would have been like had the rule change not taken 
place. Even this approach has drawbacks, as discussed by Professor Marianne Bertrand et al.,70 but for 
the moment it is the source of the best evidence of the effect of legal rules. 
Professors Alma Cohen and Rajeev Dehejia  have a nice study looking at the effect of the introduction 
of no-fault automobile insurance upon traffic fatalities.71 They use variations in state laws regarding 
no-fault insurance over the 1970 to 1998 period and find that a move from a regime with fault to no 
fault causes a 6 percent increase in traffic fatalities. What one cannot exclude is the possibility that 
changes in the law are associated with changes in the population that are themselves correlated with 
accident rates and the passage of the law.72  
This issue is more easily addressed in the context of medical care. Professors Daniel Kessler and Mark 
McClellan explore the impact that changes in state law have on the outcomes of elderly heart attack 
patients on Medicare.73 Heart attack patients are a good group to study because they generally go to the 
nearest hospital, and don't cross state lines to get into a better hospital. They find that a reduction in tort 
liability has a small, close to insignificant effect upon patient outcomes, but a large negative effect 
upon costs.74  
Kessler and McClellan use rather broad tort categories. For example, they treat reform to the collateral 
source rule and the rule of joint and several liability as a single rule change.75 Currie and MacLeod  
update the law data and use finer granularity regarding the law. We explore the effect of tort reform 
upon both the incidence of C-sections and outcomes of the mother and child.76 
We find that a decrease in liability (either reducing the cap on damages or disallowing harm due to pain 
and suffering) leads to an increase in C-section rates.77 Many find this result counter-intuitive because 
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there has been so much discussion of the idea that C-sections are a form of “defensive medicine.” In a 
world in which doctors were starting from the optimal C-section rate and were always acting in the best 
interests of their patients, then fear of lawsuits might push them to do more C-sections.  This is the type 
of thinking that is based upon the model of precaution – tort liability leading doctors to be more careful 
to avoid bad outcomes and hence to higher C-section rates.78  However, the real world C-section rate is 
thought to be much higher than necessary, suggesting that the marginal C-section is an unnecessary 
surgery that is not in the best interests of the patient.  That is, there are other forces leading doctors to 
perform unnecessary surgeries, and this tendency is restrained by the tort system.  Therefore, when 
liability is reduced, C-sections rise.79  This counter-intuitive result provides a concrete demonstration of 
the dangers of relying on an overly simplistic model of precaution without adequate empirical 
evidence.  
The study's second lesson concerns the importance of dealing with heterogeneous treatment effects.  
Most of the variation in C-section rates occurs for women whose medical condition is in a grey area – 
that is, there is some indication that a C-section may be appropriate, but it is a question of judgment.  
For these marginal cases, the gain from a C-section is close to the cost. However, C-sections are 
surgeries and there are a number of tort cases involving botched C-sections.  A rise in C-section rates 
as a consequence of reduced liability is consistent with poor surgeons increasing their C-section rates 
because they know they are less likely to be sued.  We also find that the law has no effect upon high 
risk patients, where a C-section is more likely and the quality of the physician is likely to be higher.80  
Another surprising result comes from our work on the reform of the doctrine of joint and several 
liability (“JSL”).  When there are multiple tortfeasors in a regime of JSL a plaintiff can recover all of 
her losses from a single defendant. However, this does not mean that the other defendants escape 
liability. Landes and Posner explore the contribution movement in the United States – contribution is a 
rule change that allowed the defendant who is found liable to recover losses from the other 
tortfeasors.81 
There has been a move to modify JSL to a regime in which each tortfeasor is responsible only for the 
harm they have caused. One of the motivations comes from the area of medical malpractice. When 
there is a bad medical outcome it is common to list hospital nurses as co-defendants. Under the 
respondent superior doctrine, and with JSL, the hospital could end up liable for the full amount of 
damages because nurses are employees of the hospital.  
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Several observers have pointed out that the new rule does not in fact change overall liability because, 
for example, the hospital could sue doctors for contribution.  Hence, one might expect the rule change 
to have no impact on behaviour.  However, Carvell, Currie and MacLeod  point out that in the real 
world, other defendants are often judgment proof.  Under JSL it may not be worthwhile for the “deep-
pocketed” defendant to sue the others for contribution, especially if they are judgment proof.  With 
reform, even if another tortfeasor is judgment proof, the “deep pocketed” defendant may have an 
incentive to join them to the case in order to reduce his own liability. We show that this is not only a 
theoretical possibility, but that there is evidence that JSL reform has reduced the rate of accidental 
death in the United States.82   
 
VI. DISCUSSION 
The model of precaution is an excellent first order way to think about how individuals respond to 
incentives.  It is nevertheless a relatively crude tool that necessarily relies upon value judgments – the 
subjective evaluation of how alternative choices by the tortfeasor might lead to different consequences. 
In this paper we have discussed how combining the model of commodities introduced in general 
equilibrium theory with the standard economic model of rational choice developed by Savage  allows 
us to look at decision making with the help of a Savage Table - a table that makes explicit the fact that a 
decision or act is a state-contingent commodity.83 
Savage emphasized that careful consideration of the future states that might occur is the first step in 
making a rational choice. Understanding that a commodity is a good with specific characteristics 
including time and location is essential to creating these models.  Savage solved a fundamental problem 
in rational choice theory by freeing the decision maker from the need to have a correct model of the 
world that considers every possible contingency and from the need to know the true probabilities 
associated with all states of the world.  Clearly, such a model would be impossibly complex, and true 
probabilities are unknowable.  Rather, Savage argued that actual decision making involves a simplified 
model of the world that focuses on likely events and that once a decision-maker has built her 
worldview, then the probability of an event is constructed from her preferences and subjective beliefs.  
In other words, it is necessary to first decide the set of possibly relevant outcomes before one can think 
about assigning probability weights to them. 
This perspective focuses attention on the different events that are likely to lead to harm.  These events, 
and the liability associated with them can be discussed without necessarily appealing to underlying 
probabilities. This is a useful innovation because evidence presented in court can be viewed as carefully 
specifying the events leading up to a particular outcome.  In some cases decisions can be reached 
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without appealing to probabilities, as in cases where the rule of strict liability is involved, or when a 
previous case has already established liability for the case at hand.   
Within the context of the Savage model causality is always clear and unambiguous.  However, the 
model is also able to capture the fact that decision makers may be unable to determine causal 
relationships from the evidence at hand. We briefly discussed the fundamental problem of causal 
inference that states that in general determining a causal effect is impossible.  Rather, the inference of 
causality is a function of how we believe the world operates, and in that sense requires a model of the 
world.    
Even if the courts have a good model of the world, and are able to correctly apply the Learned Hand 
rule, there is no reason to expect individuals to have the same model of the world or to behave in a way 
consistent with the Hand rule.  If everyone's decision making is governed by their own model of the 
world and their own subjective probabilities, then it should not be surprising that people faced with 
what appear to be similar situations will make different decisions. 
The Savage approach assigns consequences to events.  This is a more concrete activity than attempting 
to assess the probability of all possible events.  Hence, whether or not the courts use the Hand rule for 
the determination of negligence, it is more useful to a decision maker if they can reliably assign legal 
liability to a specific event via a bright line rule.  Doing so removes an element of uncertainty in the law 
by reducing reliance upon necessarily subjective and most likely incorrect assessments of probabilities.   
Like Posner, we conclude that the only real way to know how a law affects people's behaviour is to 
conduct empirical studies.84  We have discussed some empirical studies that address the effects of 
changes in tort law.  Possibly one of the most challenging questions going forward is to better 
understand the causal impact of legal rules on individual behaviour, as well as how to use this 
information to improve legal rule making.
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